Sudan’s Civil War: A Proxy Conflict and Its Regional Implications

 By Leshan L Naisho

As Sudan’s ongoing civil war approaches its one-and-a-half-year mark, it is becoming increasingly evident that this war has evolved into a proxy war as many internal wars on the African continent usually do. With the involvement of regional actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran and the United Arab Emirates, as well as global powers like Russia, the war is developing into a geopolitical crisis with serious implications for the region and the continent.

The conflict’s two main factions primarily involved are the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), a paramilitary group commanded by General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, commonly known as Hemedti, formed by long-time dictator Omar Al-Bashir, and the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), led by General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan. These two groups, once allies in the 2019 coup that deposed al-Bashir, found themselves at odds over the proposed integration of the RSF into the regular army as part of Sudan's transition to civilian rule. These tensions quickly escalated into hostilities and eventually violence, which spread rapidly from Khartoum, where the fighting began, to other parts of the nation, including the volatile region of Darfur.

Initially, a power struggle between rival military factions developed into a civil war, involving Sudan's diverse ethnic groups, external actors, and local actors such as the Government of Sudan, the Popular Defence Forces, non-RSF Janjaweed, Tamazuj, and the Popular Resistance. The involvement of regional actors such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and the United Arab Emirates has transformed the conflict into a proxy war with far-reaching implications for the entire region. Adding to the complexity is the involvement of Russia and the Wagner Group, a private military company known for its operations in conflict zones. The Wagner Group has supported the RSF by supplying weapons and providing military training. Russia’s participation is part of its broader strategy to secure its economic interests in Sudan’s gold mining sector as well as military interests as the Kremlin seeks to establish a military foothold in the region. Wagner’s involvement is allegedly due to its facilitation of weapons supply from the UAE to the RSF; however, these alleged claims have been publicly denied by the Sudanese government. Russia's dual approach of supporting the RSF while engaging in negotiations with the SAF reflects its intent to maintain influence in Sudan amidst the ongoing conflict.

As the war progresses, it is becoming increasingly evident that this conflict has become a complex geopolitical crisis with the potential to destabilise Sudan’s precarious neighbours. Chad, South Sudan, and the Central African Republic—all nations that share a border with Sudan—are particularly vulnerable to the spillover effects of the conflict. This will further compound the internal conflicts and economic challenges already facing these nations, which have the risk of further destabilisation as the civil war continues. The war has already spurred a humanitarian and refugee crisis with nearly 10 million people displaced, with an estimated 2.1 million already having fled the country, of which some 400,000 have fled to Chad, making it the largest single destination of refugees from the conflict, while others fled to other neighbouring countries such as the Central African Republic, Egypt, and South Sudan. The influx of refugees places additional strain on the resources and infrastructure of these already precarious nations, creating fertile ground for social and political tensions.

The economic implications of the war for both Sudan and the region at large have been disastrous, with a disruption of trade and economic activities. According to Sudan’s finance minister, Gibril Ibrahim, the Sudanese economy had contracted by 40 percent in 2023 due to the fighting, with an additional decline of 28 percent expected in 2024. He added that state revenues had also decreased by 80 percent. Sudanese port authorities estimated that international trade had fallen by 23 percent in 2023. In July, Sudanese economists estimated the total amount of damage brought by the conflict at $9 billion, or an average of $100 million per day, while the value of property and goods looted was estimated at another $40 billion, with the most affected areas being Khartoum and South Darfur. Furthermore, the war has led to the destruction of farms, which has led to a 73 percent increase in food prices, and food shortages made worse by the nation’s inability to finance the import of sufficient food stocks to cover the shortfall have led to a hunger crisis in Sudan. The ripple effects are felt in South Sudan and Chad, where disrupted trade and massive population displacements are straining resources and intensifying hunger.

Sudan’s current civil war, with its complex origins and proxy dynamics, poses significant risks to the geopolitics and economies of the region. The war’s impacts extend far beyond Sudan’s borders and threaten regional stability, further exacerbating existing challenges in the region. Addressing these issues requires coordinated regional and international efforts to stabilise the situation, provide humanitarian support, and work towards a sustainable peace agreement. Failure to do so could lead to prolonged instability and economic hardship across the region. As the crisis continues to unfold, the international community must prioritise diplomatic interventions and sustainable solutions to mitigate the impact of the Sudanese civil war on its neighbours and prevent further destabilisation in an already fragile part of the world.